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Abstract: The paper investigates the effects of ethnic diversity on economic performance and the risk of
violent conflict. Diversity has various detrimental microeconomic effects, tending to reduce public sector
performance, increase patronage, and lower the level of trust among individuals. However, whether diversity
adversely affects overall economic growth depends upon the political environment. Diversity is highly
damaging to growth in the context of limited political rights, but is not damaging in democracies. The same
relationship holds for the satisfactory performance of World Bank projects: in diverse societies, the risk of
project failure is nearly doubled by the absence of political rights. There is a relationship between ethnic
diversity and the risk of violent conflict, but it is non-monotonic. Those societies most at risk are the ones in
the middle of the range of ethnic diversity. Highly diverse societies, such as are typical of Africa, are actually
even safer than homogenous societies. A democratic Africa can thus reap the benefits which ethnic diversity
provides in terms of a reduced risk of violence, while avoiding the potential costs of reduced growth. Both
income levels and political rights are also important influences on the risk of violent conflict, and of its
escalation into full civil war. Once a society has reached full scale civil war the balance of influences appears
to change. The persistence of conflict, and the sustainability of a settlement, are more dependent upon ethnic
composition and less dependent upon income and political rights, than are the initiation and escalation of
violence. Hence, some peace settlements may need to change borders so as to increase (or reduce) the ethnic
diversity of the state.1
1. Introduction
1 
Most developing countries are ethnically diverse. For many years social scientists preferred to
ignore the brute fact of ethnic identity. More recently, evidence is accumulating that it is
detrimental to economic performance. Most notably, Easterly and Levine (1998) find that at the
aggregate level diversity significantly reduces the growth rate, and offer this as the main
explanation for the slow growth of Africa, the continent whose countries have the greatest ethnic
diversity. Not surprisingly, this result has not been welcomed in Africa. The result does not itself
provide an explanation as to why diversity might be detrimental, and it is hard to see any policy
implications: it appears to carry only the message ‘don’t live here’.  A related perception is that
ethnic diversity increases the risk of violent conflict: for example, a recent World Bank document
which surveys the literature concludes that ‘ethnic diversity may lead to increased civil strife’
(World Bank, 1997). This perception is fostered both by some graphic individual scenes of inter-
ethnic violence, and by an aggregate correlation: Africa has not only the highest ethnic diversity,
but the highest incidence of civil war. Potentially, this might even account for the detrimental
economic effects of diversity.
Even if it can be established precisely how ethnic diversity is economically dysfunctional, it might
appear to be a highly unhelpful line of research. There is nothing which a country can legitimately
do about its ethnic composition, and illegitimate acts, notably ethnic cleansing, should hardly be
encouraged.  In this paper, I show that far from being unhelpful, research reveals both a hopeful
and a practical message. I show that the effects of diversity are by no means as detrimental as is
commonly thought. In one important and highly counter-intuitive respect diversity is beneficial. 
The belief that ethnic diversity increases the risk of violence turns out to be wrong. Beyond quite
a low level of diversity, increased diversity reduces the risk of violence.
I argue that those effects which are detrimental have feasible political solutions. First, I consider
the detrimental economic effects of diversity. I show that there is a political solution to these
effects. Secondly, I consider the problem posed by moderate levels of ethnic diversity which
increase the risk of violent conflict. Statistically, the average level of diversity in developing
countries is around this peak (although most countries are either well above, or well below the
average). I investigate whether there is a political solution to this high-risk range.
Section 2 summarises and extends the recent evidence on the relationship between ethnic
diversity and economic performance. It then introduces political institutions, showing how these
can be effective in neutralising the effects of ethnic diversity.  Section 3 turns to the relationship
between ethnic diversity and violent conflict. It shows that ethnic diversity is important as a cause
of civil war, in the process by which minor rebellions escalate, and in determining the duration of
conflict and the duration of postwar peace. Finally, I show that political institutions are important
                                               
1 I would like to thank Anke Hoeffler for considerable research assistance throughout the
paper, Pablo Zoido-Lobaton for the regressions in Table 3, and Mans Soderbom for running the
hazard functions in Table 4.2
in reducing the risk of violent conflict.
2. Ethnic Diversity, Political Institutions and Economic Performance
Easterly and Levine (1998) find that ethnic diversity is correlated with slow economic growth.
They partially explain this by finding an association between diversity and poor economic
policies. They infer from this, reasonably enough, that diversity may make it more difficult for the
political process to arrive at cooperative solutions to problems, instead of fighting zero sum
games. However, they find a residual negative effect of ethnic diversity over and above its effect
via policy.
While Easterly and Levine focus upon ethno-linguistic diversity at the national level, Alesina et al.
(1997) analyse its effects at the local level, using data on American cities. They find that ethnic
diversity in American cities reduces the performance of city government in delivering a range of
public services. They argue that diversity reduces the incentive to spend on productive public
services while increasing rent-seeking expenditures. Related evidence concerns the public sector
labour market in Ghana. Collier and Garg (1998) similarly use spatially disaggregated data, towns
differing as to which tribe is locally dominant.  They argue that unless restrained, kin groups will
function as patronage systems, reducing the efficiency of promotions to the advantage of the
dominant kin group. They find that in the public sector the locally dominant group exacts a 25%
wage premium for its members, controlling for worker characteristics. By contrast, in the private
sector there is no such premium, presumably because the private sector has a stronger incentive
to restrain kin group patronage. Hence, in addition to worsening macroeconomic policies, ethnic
diversity may reduce the efficiency of public service delivery.
Potentially, a third route by which diversity might damage economic performance is if it inhibited
the formation of ‘social capital’ and trust, resulting in higher transactions costs. To date, the
formation of trust has been investigated predominantly at the micro-level, notably by Putnam
(1993). Ethnic fractionalisation has been considered an asset in building trust within the ethnic
group, but its effect on society as a whole has not, to my knowledge, been investigated. Here I
use internationally comparable data for 23 countries in which the level of trust is measured
through attitudinal surveys which ask whether other people in the society can be trusted. Putnam
makes trust endogenous to particular forms of social interaction. However, social interaction in
turn must be endogenous to its costs, and so I take the more conventional economic route of
explaining trust in terms of the costs which agents face in deciding whether to interact socially.
Potentially, ethnic divisions constitute an additional barrier to social interaction and hence detract
from trust. I proxy the costs of social interaction by the density of the telephone system and the
spatial density of the population. The results are reported in Table 1, below.3
Table 1: Is Ethnic Diversity a Barrier to Trust?
(Dependent variable, trust, on a scale of 0-100)
Variable coefficient t-statistic
Ethnic fractionalisation -0.14 -1.3
Telephone density (ln) 16.35  6.2
Population density -0.17 -3.0





Before discussing the effect of ethnicity I will briefly comment on the other variables since they
are of some interest in their own right. Trust turns out to be explicable in terms of  the costs of
social interaction with the telephone density highly important.
2  Population density enters as a
quadratic: people trust their neighbours when they don’t have many of them, but also when
population density is very high. The effect of ethnic fractionalisation is unfortunately hard to
interpret. It is not statistically significant at an acceptable level, but not so insignificant that it can
reasonably be concluded that it is not important. The coefficient is negative and fairly large: the
difference between the least and most ethnically diverse societies maps into a one standard
deviation decrease in trust. This evidence thus weakly suggests that ethnic diversity is a barrier to
the formation of trust.
To summarise, ethnic fractionalisation appears to be bad for economic performance on the
evidence of economic growth, macroeconomic policy, city government performance, public
sector wage determination, and the determinants of trust. I now introduce the effect of political
institutions.
Democracy has the potential both to discipline governments into delivering reasonable economic
policies and to provide a framework in which  groups can negotiate mutually beneficial outcomes.
I start with a baseline regression (Table 3) in which I explain average per capita GDP growth
1960-90 using a standard set of non-policy, structural characteristics, namely the initial level of
per capita GDP, the rate of population growth, and whether the country is landlocked. I exclude
all policy variables since these must be presumed to be endogenous to ethnic diversity. To this I
add ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, scored on the range 0-100, and the extent of democratic
                                               
    
2 The telephone density might, of course, be proxying other factors, notably income. Since
income is itself endogenous to trust it is not appropriate directly to control for it. However, the
telephone system is much more significant and powerful than other forms of infrastructure which
are equally correlated with income.4
political rights, scored on the range 1 (fully democratic) - 7 (the absence of political rights).
3 
Table 2: Two Regressions of Growth on Ethnic Fractionalisation and Democracy
Baseline Regression Interaction Effect
variable  coefficient t-stat coefficient  t-stat
constant 10.73  3.42  9.20  3.55
LnGDP -0.90 -2.55 -0.81 -2.59
LnPopulation -0.73 -2.05 -0.86 -2.54
Landlocked -1.01 -1.85 -0.99 -1.84
ELF -0.0156 -2.22 - -
Political Rights -0.26 -1.73 - -
ELF*Political Rights -0.0043 -3.22
Adjusted r
2 = 0.16 Adjusted r
2 = 0.18
F = 4.63 F = 6.20
n = 94 N = 94
All variables are significant: democracy raises the growth rate, fractionalisation reduces it. Ethnic
diversity appears to be very detrimental: compared with a homogenous society, a maximally
diverse society grows around 1.6 percentage points more slowly, and ends up with a steady-state
income only around one fifth that of the homogenous society.
I now investigate how ethnic fractionalisation interacts with democracy. Potentially, the
interaction effect could be positive or negative. At the risk of over-simplification I distinguish
between performance politics and identity politics. In the former the political system assists in
improving economic policies. It does this in two ways. First, it facilitates social capital and
cooperation. Secondly, electors punish governments which deliver poor economic performance
and sustain those which deliver good performance. By contrast, with identity politics citizens are
reminded of differences and so build less social capital and are less able to cooperate. Their
loyalty to a party is maintained irrespective of economic performance. Governments deliver
                                               
3 I proxy political rights using the Gastil Index. This is a subjective judgement of a number
of underlying attributes, including the meaningfulness of elections, fairness of electoral laws and
campaigning opportunities, the voting power of the electorate, the existence of political
competition, evidence of political power shifting through elections, significant opposition voting,
freedom from external or military control of domestic politics, minority self-determination or
pluralism, decentralisation of political power, and the attempt of political agents to reach a
consensus on national issues. Although subjective, the Gastil index is quite closely correlated with
other indices such as those of Bollen and Humana (see the discussion in Fedderke and Klitgaard
(forthcoming)).5
patronage to loyalists rather than services to the median voter.
An implication of the result of Alesina et al. is that the interaction is likely to be negative. Ethnic
diversity at the level of the American city appears to be associated with the shift from
performance politics to identity politics. However, the interaction might well be positive.
Democracy might provide institutions in which potentially costly disputes between ethnic groups
are mediated. Cooperation might be sufficiently easy in homogenous societies that it does not
depend upon democratic institutions, whereas in diverse societies these institutions make the
difference between  zero sum and cooperative solutions. An ethnically diverse society might thus
gain more from democracy than a homogenous society because the latter has less need of dispute
resolution. This need not conflict with the Alesina et al result. The ethnic diversity of a political
decision process is endogenous to political boundaries. Decentralisation offers the possibility of
shifting certain economic decisions into a different ethnic space. The USA has performance
politics at the federal level (‘it’s the economy, stupid’), but identity politics at much of the local
level. However, this is quite unusual and probably reflects the immigrant nature of the society.
Most countries which have identity politics have it at the national level. This is because in most
countries there is little ethnic diversity at the local level, while national boundaries are much
larger than those of the ethnic groups. Hence, in such societies  local politics is more likely to be
performance politics. This, for example, is part of the rationale for regional decentralisation in
Ethiopia: regional level democracy is ethnically fairly homogenous, despite diversity at the
national level.
I now test how ethnic diversity and democracy interact by including the interaction term
ELF*Political Rights in the regression. Once this term is included, both ethnic diversity and
political rights become completely insignificant (not reported).
4  Their entire effect works through
their interaction. Once these insignificant direct effects are eliminated from the regression, the
interaction is the most significant variable in the regression. The coefficient is large and negative.
Since political rights are measured on a diminishing scale of 1-7, this tells us that democracy
massively reduces the problem posed by ethnic diversity. Specifically, in a completely
undemocratic political system a homogenous society will grow at 3 percentage points more
rapidly than a maximally fractionalised society. By contrast, in a fully democratic political system
the growth differential narrows to a modest 0.4 percentage points. The lack of political rights is
economically ruinous in ethnically highly fractionalised societies. 
I now investigate the same relationship at the project level. I utilise the project evaluations of the
Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the World Bank for all evaluated projects from
1958 to 1996 in a total of 87 countries. OED classifies projects as satisfactory or unsatisfactory
and its evaluation is independent of the bank staff responsible for the project. For a previous use
of the data set and a more detailed discussion of its features, see Kaufmann et al. (1995). The
dependent variable is the proportion of projects in a country which were classified as
                                               
4 Even when each is included separately along with the interaction effect their t-statistics
are only 0.4 and 0.6 respectively, while the interaction effect is highly significant.6
unsatisfactory. The explanatory variables were initially the same as for the growth regressions.
However, neither being landlocked nor the rate of population growth were even remotely
significant and were dropped. The baseline regression (Table 3) therefore includes GDP, as in
Table 2, and the direct effects of ethnic diversity and political rights. Ethnic diversity was most
significant when entered as the square of the ELF index. In this baseline the direct effects of
ethnic diversity and political rights are qualitatively similar to those in the baseline growth
regression: diversity and a lack of rights both increase the risk that a project fails, although the
latter is not statistically significant. The second regression in Table 3 explores the interaction
effect between diversity and political rights. Again, diversity is best proxied by the square of the
ELF index. When the interaction term is introduced as an additional variable alongside the direct
effects, both the direct effects become insignificant. When the direct effects are excluded, the
regression with the interaction effect dominates the baseline regression. Thus, as in the growth
regression, ethnic diversity and political rights only matter for the success of projects because of
their interaction. An ethnically diverse society does not have a higher failure rate as long as it is
fully democratic. However, in an ethnically diverse society political rights matter a lot. The failure
rate on projects rises from 26% to 44% as we switch from a democratic to an undemocratic
diverse society.
Table 3. Two Regressions of Project Performance on Ethnic Fractionalization and
Democracy
    Baseline regression          Interaction Effect
                                                              
Variable coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic
Constant 0.43 1.66 0.30 1.47
LnGDP 0.052 1.72 0.063 2.39
ELF2 -0.000015 -1.94 - -
Political rights -.013 -1.04 - -
ELF2*Political rights - - -0.000003 -2.22
Adjusted r
2 = 0.19 Adjusted r
2 = 0.20
F = 7.95 F = 11.82
n = 87 n = 87
Finally, when the same regressions are run controlling for nine time periods and 16 project types,
the same results are found, with the interaction effect being more highly significant, and indeed
the most significant variable in the regression.
To conclude, not only is the lack of political rights ruinous for growth in ethnically diverse
societies, it is also ruinous for projects.7
3. Ethnic Diversity, Political Institutions and Conflict
I now turn to the relationship between ethnic diversity and violent conflict. I summarise and
extend the results of my previous and current work with co-authors (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998,
1998a, and Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 1998). The risk of civil war is modelled as a cost-
benefit calculation of rebellion.
The costs of rebellion are the cost of coordination and the opportunity cost. Recall that in the
context of public service provision Alesina et al. find that ethnic fractionalisation increases the
difficulty of cooperation. If cooperation is a necessary input into the initiation and maintenance of
rebellion, ethnic diversity among potential rebels may actually tend to reduce the risk of violent
conflict. This implies that the relationship between the ethnic diversity of the society and the risk
of conflict would be non-monotonic. A society with two ethnic groups would have lower
coordination costs for rebellion than a homogenous society since the rebels could identify
themselves as ethnically distinct from government supporters. However, a society with twenty
ethnic groups would have higher coordination costs for rebellion than a society with two ethnic
groups (and potentially than a homogenous society) since potential rebels would need to
cooperate across ethnic boundaries.
The other postulated cost of rebellion is the opportunity cost. This can reasonably be proxied by
per capita income. At very low levels of income, people, and especially the teenage males who
man most rebellions, have little to lose from joining rebel armies.
The benefits of rebellion are conditional upon military success, which is in turn dependent upon
the financial capacity of the government to purchase defense. Clearly, actual defense expenditure
is endogenous to the risk of war and so cannot be used to predict it. Instead, I proxy the taxable
base of the economy by the share of primary exports in GDP, these being highly taxed in most
societies.  Conditional upon success, the benefits of rebellion depend upon its objectives. Some
rebel groups aspire to secession. A simple proxy for the desire for secession is the size of the
population: governments in countries with larger populations are less likely to satisfy the needs of
their peripheral citizens (see Alesina and Spolaore, 1997). Other rebel groups aspire to capture
the state. In this case a proxy for the gains from rebel victory is the taxable base which is being
captured. Hence, the taxable base has an ambiguous net effect on the risk of rebellion, both
reducing the chance of rebel victory and increasing the gain should victory be achieved. Since the
net effect need not be monotonic in the taxable base, in the test of the model primary exports are
entered as a quadratic.
The theory is summarised formally in (1). The probability of civil war increases with the net
present value of the utility which the rebels achieve by war.
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where:8
p = probability of rebel victory
T = taxable base, proxied by primary export share in GDP
P = population (ln)
Y = opportunity cost, proxied by per capita income
C = costs of coordination, proxied by ethno-linguistic fractionalisation
The model is tested on the civil wars since 1960, using country characteristics as of 1960 or as
close to 1960 as the data permits. The probit attempts to predict the 27 states in which civil wars
occurred post-1960 from among the 97 states for which data are available. This is a good date for
starting the analysis since prior to around 1960 many states were colonies and so underlying risks
of civil war were largely suppressed. Hence, for example, the potential endogeneity of income to
civil war risk is largely avoided. The results are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Two Probit Regressions of the Occurrence of Civil War
Baseline Political Institutions Added
_________________ ______________________
Variable coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio
constant -1.543 2.14 -2.61 -2.66
Income             -0.001 2.70 -0.0004 -1.87
Primary 16.16 2.56 13.89  2.18
Primary2 -29.47 2.28 -27.71 -2.05
ELF  0.033 1.35 0.027  1.09
ELF2 -0.0004 1.60 -0.0003 -1.26
Population  0.0003 2.39 0.0002    2.26
Political Rights - - 0.225  1.80
Source: Baseline regression from Collier and Hoeffler (1998)
In the baseline regression all variables are significant with the expected signs. The risk of civil war
is strongly related to the level of income: poverty sharply increases the risk of war. The effect of
ethnic diversity is non-monotonic: moderately diverse societies are more at risk than homogenous
societies, consistent with the reduction in the coordination costs of rebellion if potential rebels are
ethnically differentiated from government supporters. However, highly ethnically diverse societies
are even less at risk of civil war than ethnically homogenous societies, consistent with diversity
among potential rebels increasing the coordination costs of rebellion. When these effects are
applied to Africa, the high incidence of civil war on the continent is explained entirely by its low
income: Africa’s high ethnic diversity has made it less at risk from violent conflict than had it had
the lower ethnic diversity found on average in other societies (see Collier and Hoeffler, 1998a).
Natural resource exports increase the risk of war unless they are abundant, my interpretation
being that the increased lure of capturing the state is eventually offset by the enhanced capacity of
the government to defend itself and buy opponents off.9
The second probit in Table 4 adds political rights measured as previously. Per capita income and
democratic rights are correlated, and the introduction of the latter reduces the effect of income,
although leaving it significant. The effect of ethnic diversity loses significance, but the coefficients
are little affected. Political rights substantially affect the risk of civil war.  Moving from the
lowest to the highest level of rights has an equivalent affect to raising income from the mean to
2.4 times the mean. Thus, democratisation is worth around half a century of income growth in
terms of its contribution to peace.
Although ethnically diverse societies are not directly prone to violent conflict, in the absence of
democracy they are prone to poverty and this in turn makes them vulnerable to conflict. Recall
that a maximally fractionalised society, if lacking in democratic institutions, grows 3 percentage
points more slowly than a homogenous society. Since the mean per capita growth rate 1960-90
has been only 1.7 percentage points, this effectively condemns such societies to radically low
incomes. Cumulatively, income growth lifts other societies out of poverty and so out of the risk
of civil war. For example, compare a society with maximum fractionalisation and one with that
level of fractionalisation which directly maximises the risk of war, which occurs when the index is
45. The completely fractionalised society is directly much safer. In units of income, complete
fractionalisation is worth a 62% increase in income relative to the mean for equivalent safety.
However, if the completely fractionalised society is also completely undemocratic, whereas the
partly-fractionalised society is fully democratic, the latter will grow 1.4 percentage points more
rapidly than the former. If the two societies start from the same level of income, the democratic
society will have fully offset its higher risk of civil war arising from its dangerous fractionalisation
by its higher income after only 34 years.
Hence, democracy reduces the risk of war both directly, through the enhanced capacity to
mediate disputes, and indirectly, through higher income. In the most highly fractionalised
societies the main contribution of democracy to peace is through its effect on income.  This is
partly because the contribution to income growth in such societies is much larger, and partly
because, for a given income level, the risk of war in highly fractionalised societies is lower. In
partially fractionalised societies the risk of civil war is at its peak, and the contribution of
democracy to income growth is reduced. However, democracy also delivers a substantial direct
reduction to the risk of conflict.
5 
Finally, I turn to the problems posed by the escalation of rebellion, by current civil wars, and by
the preservation of peace in postwar situations. I show that these are subject to processes which
are to an extent common across the three problems, but which are distinct from the risk of civil
war in initially peaceful societies.
                                               
5 Unfortunately, while democracy has these two powerful conflict-reducing effects, the
transition to democracy may involve a temporary phase of increased risk. This is indeed the core
result of Gurr (1993). I do not revisit this problem in the present paper.10
For the escalation of rebellion I utilise data by Gurr (1993), who distinguishes between six stages
of rebellion, the bottom rung being political banditry and the top being civil war, in between being
terrorism and guerrilla activities of varying scales. I use an ordered probit model to explain the
passage from peace through these six stages. The core innovation in the important Gurr data set
is its focus on disadvantaged ethnic minorities. However, in order to keep the results comparable
with the other regressions I do not use this aspect of Gurr’s data, and instead retain the 0-100
measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation. The Gurr data set does not cover as many countries
as the previous samples, but is nevertheless substantial.
For the problems of civil wars continuing and of a postwar peace being broken I estimate hazard
functions. These are variants on those estimated in Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (1998) which
provides a fuller discussion of the methods and data used. The hazard functions model the
duration of conflict and postwar peace respectively, measured in months. The civil war data is
predominantly drawn from Singer and Small (1982, 1994) but is updated to 1997. The hazard
functions are estimated using semi-parametric methods rather than the more restrictive Weibull
specification. The hazard of peace during a civil war is estimated using the first and (where
pertinent) second spell of war for each country in the data set, starting from 1960. The hazard of
renewed war following a peace can only be investigated for countries which have at some stage
settled a civil war and this restricts the sample. In order to increase the sample size this hazard is
estimated for all countries which experienced a civil war post-1945. Since the focus of the present
paper is not on the structure of the hazard but rather on the significance of explanatory variables,
only the latter are reported.
The results for all three processes are reported in Table 5.11
Table 5: The Escalation, Maintenance and Revival of Violent Conflict
Escalation Maintenance Revival
________________ ________________ ________________
Variable coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat.
Income -0.00008 -1.47 -0.00017 -0.92 -0.00004 -0.22
Primary -5.48 -0.63 - - - -
Primary2 5.25  0.20 - - - -
ELF 0.053  1.92 0.0512 1.71 -0.05 -1.59
ELF2 0.00052 -1.85 -0.0006 1.74 0.006 1.72
Population (ln) 0.18  1.04  0.0693 0.32 -0.2385 -1.21
Political Rights 0.30  2.33 -0.839 0.72 -0.1517 -1.19
N = 47 N = 45 N = 56
Note, primary exports were completely insignificant in the hazard functions and were dropped to
ease estimation.
These three results display a common pattern. First,  ethnic diversity is always important, with a
quadratic relationship, and is consistently more significant than in the probits of the causes of civil
war reported in Table 4. Note that this is despite the much smaller sample sizes. Secondly, and by
contrast, income, population and primary exports are no longer even remotely significant. Why
should the relative importance of income and ethnic diversity change so substantially? Recall that
income proxies the opportunity cost of joining rebellion whereas ethnic diversity proxies the cost
of coordination. I think that the reason for the difference is that in the determination of whether a
civil war occurs the decisive factor is whether would-be rebel leaders can persuade others to join
them. Since this is initially a free choice of potential recruits, they weigh the opportunity cost.
However, only a rebellion has started, whether it collapses or is maintained and escalated depends
upon the capacity to sustain rebel cohesion. Ordinary rebel soldiers do not have the choice to
quit. Indeed, all armies classify quitting as desertion and punish it severely. This diminishes the
importance of income, since the calculus of individual choice is less important. However, rebel
groups easily splinter and fight among themselves, and indeed this is a prime government strategy
in coping with rebellion. I suspect that the quadratic relationship in ethnic fractionalisation
proxies the difficulties of keeping the officer cadres cohesive.
The preservation of peace in newly postwar situations appears to be determined by the same
process (but with opposite signs) which determines whether wars are sustained.  This is plausible.
Rebel organisations are not voluntarily disbanded during the early stages of a postwar peace, and
the inability of rebels to sustain their cohesion helps to preserve the peace, just as it helps to avoid
escalation of a conflict, and to avoid the perpetuation of civil war.12
Political rights is the most significant variable in the escalation probit and has large effects.
Democracy substantially reduces the risk that terrorist groups will be able to build up their
support base sufficiently to escalate violence to full scale civil war. However, political rights
appear to be less effective in reducing the duration of conflict once it has escalated to full scale
war, and in reducing the risk of renewed conflict following peace.
Thus, the problem of avoiding civil war is to an extent distinct from the problems of preventing
escalation, ending current wars, and sustaining new peace. The degree of ethnic diversity in the
four processes is, however, common: homogenous societies are safer than moderately diverse
societies, but highly diverse societies are even safer than homogenous societies. Political rights
are very important in the prevention and escalation of conflict, but appear not to be so effective in
achieving and sustaining settlements once civil wars are underway. Income is very important in
preventing civil war, but less effective once there has been resort to violence, and there is little
evidence for its importance in reducing the duration of war, or of sustaining postwar peace.
4. Conclusion
Ethnic identity and diversity has, until recently, been something of a taboo area in the analysis of
economic performance. The recent evidence which has begun to break this taboo has seemed
highly discouraging. Strong and specific mechanisms whereby ethnically fractionalised societies
were liable to have worse economic performance than more homogenous societies have been
established. Further, there has been a presumption, although not formally researched, that ethnic
fractionalisation is the cause of civil war and other forms of violent conflict. This has been treated
as a particularly disturbing set of results in Africa because it is the continent with the highest level
of ethnic fractionalisation, the slowest growth, and the highest incidence of civil war.
In this paper I approached the analysis of ethnicity from a highly aggregated, cross-country
perspective. This is clearly not a substitute for country-level studies, at which level many factors
undetectable in the present approach will be detectable. The approach can, perhaps, be seen as
that in which economics has a comparative advantage, and as a complement to country-based
work which by itself faces the difficulty of identifying what is distinctive at the national level. I
first found evidence for a further mechanism whereby ethnic fractionalisation can reduce income,
namely by reducing trust, and so raising transactions costs. However, I then  established two
more hopeful sets of results.  One was that political institutions matter more where a society has a
potential problem of ethnic fractionalisation than in homogenous societies. Democracy has the
capacity almost completely to offset the economic damage which can be done by a high level of
fractionalisation.  The other was that the relationship between ethnic fractionalisation and the risk
of violent conflict is more subtle than has been thought. Highly fractionalised societies are
actually directly safer than less fractionalised societies. Indeed, the high level of diversity in Africa
is a source of strength, not of danger. It is the middle-levels of fractionalisation which are more
dangerous for violence, whereas the effects of fractionalisation on economic growth are
continuously negative. While the relationship between fractionalisation and conflict is complex,
the contribution of political institutions to peace is, like their contribution to growth, substantial.13
Since income is also an important determinant of the risk of conflict, democracy works twice
over to reduce risks: it both directly defuses conflict and indirectly reduces the incentive for
rebellion. Further, economic development works to reduce the risk of conflict.
The implications for societies with a high degree of ethnic diversity, such as Africa, are
encouraging. As long as they have a high degree of political rights, such societies achieve the best
of both worlds. Democracy effectively eliminates the potentially negative effects of ethnic
diversity on economic growth, while the high diversity makes the society even safer from violent
conflict than homogenous societies.
Finally, I focused on those societies already experienced in violence, and investigated the
determinants of the continuation, escalation and resumption of violence in these societies. The
three processes display similar patterns which are distinctive from the determinants of the risk of
civil war in societies which have previously been at peace for substantial periods. In these
processes ethnic fractionalisation is more important and income levels are unimportant. In such
societies the maintenance or creation of extreme ethnic fractionalisation may be the best hope of
peace. In these civil war societies federation to build highly fractionalised societies may be a more
effective solution than economic development. However, such highly fractionalised societies must
be democratic if they are not to suffer high economic costs.14
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